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Abstract 
 
Do women really improve conditions for gender equality after becoming heads of states? This 
study investigates if having a woman at the helm of country’s decision making processes 
leads to better indicators on women conditions.  Using time series observations for the period 
2000-2011, we test the hypothesis with the Liberian experience. Our findings do not show 
significant changes between the first mandate of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and the period before. 
Policy implications are discussed.   
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1. Introduction 
Do women really improve conditions for gender equality after becoming heads of states?  
This question is increasingly gaining scientific attention. Some gender differences have be 
noticed in household management, with women having an edge over men in, inter alia, the: (i) 
training of children and development of their potentials and (ii) purchase of goods of primary 
necessity (Thomas, 1990, 1994; Phipps & Burton, 1998; Hoddad & Hoddinott, 1994; 
Hoddinott & Haddad, 1995). More recently, a plethora of studies have linked sex to 
institutional problems and authomatisation of women. According to Beaman et al. (2009),  the 
presence of women in power has radically changed the perception of the electorate on the 
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effectiveness of women in positions of authority. The election of the woman as the head of a 
village (pradhan) has reduced stereotypes associated with the female sex among villagers of 
masculine sex in India. Another study by Beamane et al. (2012) established that where a 
woman has never held a position of village-head, the parental value-perceptions of differences 
between boys and girls are wide. The evidence of women that are village-heads increases the 
aspirations of parents towards their girls on the one hand and self-confidence and ambition 
among girls on the other hand. Pande and Topalova (2013, p. 15) have emphasised that   when 
women occupy decision-making positions or are endowed with responsibilities of authority, 
they can change the aspirations of young girls by taking measures which, among others: 
enable women to have equal opportunities as men and promote successful women in society 
as role models. These two instruments coexist and cannot easily be dissociated. The emphasis 
is consistent with Clots-Figueras (2012) who has advanced that the causal nexus is in the 
following order: the gender of politicians affects the level of education of individuals growing 
in quarters where such politicians are elected.  
 More nuanced results have also been documented in the literature. Ferreira and  
Gyorko (2011) and Campa (2011) do not find any significant influence from increasing 
female representation in USA towns and Spanish municipalities respectively. According to 
Ferreira and Gyorko, the sex of the mayor (from the results of political elections) has no 
significant effect on the size of the local government, spending composition, rate of 
employment and level of criminality. Clots-Figueras (2011) also present interesting results. 
The author’s work suggest that female-politicians from unprivileged or cast tribes invest more 
in social (education and health) and distribution on the one hand and on the other hand, on 
laws favoring the economic rights of women. On the contrary, female legislators from 
superior or privileged casts do not have any incidence on the laws favourable to women and 
show less concern over social issues, compared to their counterparts. Kodila-Tedika (2013) 
shows that female representation leads to an improvement of gender equality in political 
rights; but unfortunately, do not influence the legislature on violence against women and a 
simple correlation with economic rights of the African woman.  
 In light of the above, there is an apparent ambiguity in the literature on the gender-
equality consequences of female political representation. The present line of inquiry takes the 
issues of female representation in political circles into account. The study closest to the 
current positioning is Kodila-Tedika (2013) who has investigated a cross-section of African 
countries. We incorporate some unexplored dimensions and recommendations from the study, 
notably: the need to engage case studies in investigating the hypothesis. Here, we are trying to 
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understand the incidence of the female African head of state on institutional and gender 
indicators. Concretely, we use time series gender-related and female rights indicators of the 
Republic of Liberia to assess the direct and indirect (or image) effects. The choice of Liberia 
is motivated by the fact that, it is the only African country within this scope for which data is 
available for exploration. It should be noted that: (i) for the Malawi experience with Joyce 
Banda (April 2012 to May 2014), data is still not yet available and (ii) Mauritius president 
Ameenah Gurib-Fakim has only been in office since the 5
th
 of June 2015. Moreover, in 
relation to the Malawian experience, the 2015 World Development Indicators published by 
the World Bank on April 15
th
 displays missing data for the period 2012-2015 for many 
indicators.  
 Before we engage the empirical analysis, it is relevant to devote some space to 
presenting some insights into President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s position on issues motivating 
this inquiry. She is an economist graduate from the Harvard University and 2011 Nobel peace 
leaureat who was elected as the Liberian head of state on January 16
th
 2006. Hence, she is the 
first female to have been elected into office in Africa. Her curriculum vitae reveal positions of 
influence in decision-making circles that favour female empowerment and gender equality. 
She is also affiliated to many influential organisations, notably: Alpha Kappa Alpha Sorority, 
Incorporated. It is logical to infer that she is conscious of the importance of gender equality 
because she is a founding member of the International Institute for Women in Political 
Leadership. Moreover, she was the 2011 recipient of the ‘African Gender Award’1 which 
recognises her achievements in promoting: (i) free education for children2 and (ii) gender 
empowerment through the establishment of a fund entitled ‘Market Women’s Fund’. Her 
                                                          
1
 The African Gender Awards is  every two years, awarded by a Selection Committee presided by Mrs Gertrude 
Mongella, former president of the Pan-African parliament and is composed of: civil society personalities, a 
representative of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), a representative of the African 
Union and the press. The committee evaluates improvements that African countries have made on the 
implementation of the Declaration for Gender Equality in Africa.  
2
We recall that during her first mandate, she put in place a national policy for female education which was 
facilitated by the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and applauded by many international partners 
which emphasised the following recommendations: (i) attain the second objective of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) on development by guaranteeing free and compulsory primary education for all and 
a reduction of school fees by 50%; (ii) more recruitment and training of female teachers; (iii) the putting in place 
of  scholarly orientation counsels for girls; (iv) ending impunity benefit by teachers from sexual violence and 
aggression towards girls; (v) offering of civics education in schools in order to boost personal image so that girls 
can reject sexual violence; (vi) marginal increases of the number scholarships in favour of girls; (vii) reinforcing 
medical treatment systems at schools; (vii) opening of more Parent Teacher Associations (PTA) and (viii) 
promotion of feminine clubs and education of adults.  
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position on the issue investigated by this study can be partly motivated by her view on 
‘women and gender’ during an interview with the African Development Bank (AfDB) “To 
ensure that they get the best education possible – quality education – to enable us to increase 
the level of our participation, particularly among women in our society at all levels, to ensure 
that we become more competitive nationally and regionally. My message is to continue to 
pursue aggressively the skills, the education, the capacity that will make Africa as competitive 
in the world as any other region” (AfDB, 2013)3.  
The rest of the study organised as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the data and 
methodology. The empirical analysis is covered in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Methodology  
The objective of this study is to assess to what extend can the political influence of a female 
head of state be translated into changes in some gender indicators. The empirical evidence is 
based on time series data for the period 2000 to 2011 that is divided into two sub-samples. 
The first sub-sample is for the period before the election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (hence, 
BEJS). The second sub-sample is the period of her first mandate 2007-2011 (FEJS). The 
BEJS period is characterised by substantial political strife. This can be articulated by the high 
number of presidents
4
.  
 The empirical strategy consists of first calculating the means of every indicator for the 
two periods. To this means, we apply the ‘difference-in-means’ test. We also employ a 
plethora of tests for robustness purposes, notably: Pettitt (1979), the Standard normal 
homogeneity test (SNHT) of Buishand (1982) following Alexandersson (1986) and the 
assessment of Von Neumann (1941)
5
.  
 The Pettitt test is a non parametric test which does not necessitate any hypothesis on 
the distribution of data. It is an adaption of the Mann-Whtiney test based on ranks, which 
                                                          
3
 The interested reader can find more information on the following link : http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-
events/article/liberian-president-ellen-johnson-sirleaf-on-women-and-gender-11587/   
4
Accordingly, Charles Taylor ruled the country from August 2
nd
 1997 to August 11
th
  2003. After he stood down 
from office, Moses ZehBlah, then vice-president ensured the interim till October 14
th
 2003 when the transitional 
government supported by the United Nations was put in place. This transition was led by Gyude Bryant until the 
election of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf.   
5
We employ the XLSTAT-Time software for the last-four tests. The alternative hypothesis of these tests is a 
unique deviation. For all the tests, XLSTAT reveals p-values using re-sampling by Monte Carlo. We 
approximate the calculations because exact computations are either impossible or extremely time-consuming.  
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enables the identification of the time during which change occurs. The SNHT test is based on 
the null hypothesis that reduced-centred relations between the observed values of the series 
and mean follow a normal distribution, N (0,1). The Buishand test is based on the null 
hypothesis that variables follow one or many distributions having the same mean. Finally, the 
report of Von Neumann is based on the sum of differenced squares between two successive 
values in a series. Graphs corresponding to these tests are presented in the Appendix in order 
to enhance readability. Beyond the statistics, the presence of two means (µ1 and µ2) implies 
that a rupture has been detected in the series. The detected two periods are still indicated by 
different lines which are apparent in the graphs.  
 
2.2 Data  
We use the legislation on violence against women, the economic rights of women, the 
political rights of the female gender, gender equality, equality of representation in rural zones 
and the participation of women in active life. The first measure is sourced from the Social 
Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI), the 2009 Gender Institutions and Development 
Database (GID-DB) and the Social and Welfare Statistics. These are extracted from statistics 
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). This indicator 
provides quantified information related to domestic and sexual violence as well as sexual 
molestation. While this first indicator is not available for Africa, to address the shortcoming 
we use estimations provided by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation on economic rights. The variable 
ranges between 0 and 1, with values closer to 1 indicating the worst performance by 
countries.  
 The second and third measures are obtained from the Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) 
Human Rights Data Project. The second variable measures a plethora of human rights criteria 
recognised at the international levels, notably: equal pay/salary; freedom in professional 
choice or employment without the need for spouse or masculine-parental approval; parity in 
recruitment and professional promotion practices; employment security (maternal leave, 
unemployment advantages, non-arbitrary firing from work…etc); non-discrimination by 
employers; no sexual harassment at work; right to nocturnal work; right to exercise risky 
professional activities and the right to work with security forces (army or police). This 
variable ranges from 0 to 3, with higher values indicating better results. It is important to note 
that, some African countries have missing observations. The missing observations are also 
filled with estimations from the Mo Ibrahim Foundation.  
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 The last proxy examines many rights recognised at the international level, notably: the 
right to vote; the liberty of candidacy for a political office; equality in governmental functions 
and the right to belong to a political party. The variable ranges from 1 to 3, with higher values 
indicating better results. Corresponding missing data is addressed by estimations from the Mo 
Ibrahim Foundation on economic rights.  
 The equality variable is obtained from the World Bank’s International Development 
Association (IDA) Resource Allocation Index. This variable
6
 evaluates the level at which a 
country has legislated and adopted institutions and programs destined to enforcing the respect 
of rights and policies, which include, inter alia:  (i) promoting equal access by men and 
women to opportunities of human capital development; (ii) promoting equal access by men 
and women to economic and production resources and (iii) according to men and women 
equal status and protection before the law. As to what regards the dimension of human capital 
development, emphasis is placed on: (i) education with the completion of the primary cycle 
and access to the secondary, (ii) access to obstetrician medical services and (iii) family 
planning as well as the fertility rate of adolescents. With respect to access to economic and 
production rights, the following are considered:  participation in the work force, land title and 
property and inheritance rights. In relation to equal status and protection before the law, 
emphasis is placed on: individual and family rights, personal security (violence against 
women and sexual molestation) and political participation. This indicator ranges from 0 to 6, 
with higher values indicating better results.  
 The variable on equal representation in rural areas is obtained from the Performance-
based Allocation System (PBAS): Rural Sector Performance Assessment (RSPA). The 
indicator measures the capacity of laws, politics, institutions and practices to promote an 
equal representation among men and women in local decision making processes. It also 
evaluates the representation framework of women in the rural areas (producer associations, 
cooperatives…etc) or the existence of legal or effective barriers (contributions and obligation 
of land ownership…). The indicator also varies from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating 
better scores.  
 Lastly, the variable on female participation in active life is obtained from the World 
Bank Development Indicators. This indicator measures the proportion of females (15 years 
                                                          
6
 The description is consistent with that provided by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation. It is the same logic with the 
indicator that follows.  
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and above) that is economically active (participation in the production of commodities during 
a given period). It ranges from 0 to 100, with higher values showing better performance.  
3. Empirical analysis  
 The empirical findings are presented in Table 1. Neither the first nor the last indicator 
gives credit to the gender-inclusive policies of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. Accordingly, 
the first indicator which is the major variable does not enable us to establish that her first 
mandate resulted in enhanced gender equality. In essence, no significant evolution of this 
indictor is found between the period before (BEJS) and her first mandate (FEJS)
7
. This 
indicator may be too broad to provide the necessary information because certain changes 
could counteract themselves, essentially because it embodies driving dimensions on gender 
equality. Hence, we consider some gender dimensions that could be influenced directly (new 
laws, effective application of law) or indirectly (image effect).  
 The last indicator was expected to reveal quite interesting results because it entails 
quite some interesting variables, notably: emotion and the seriousness of problems. It is also a 
dimension that could lead to less ambivalence, at least from an official framework within 
society.  It relates to violence afflicted on women. Here again, we do not notice any change. 
The case of Ruth Berry Peal constitutes a good illustration of a problem at this level. She was 
captured and forced to sustain female genital mutilations (FGM)
8
 by some members of 
Sande
9
. Unfortunately, the legal process against the perpetrators has not been smooth.  
While Liberia is in the process of post-conflict reconstruction, with discussions from 
the government (which are at times translated in actions
10
) sexual violence remains recurrent. 
Some studies have established that 29% of women (married women included) have been 
victim of physical and sexual violence perpetrated by a male partner during the past 12 
months
11
. 
                                                          
7
 The results are not provided but are available upon request. The same tendency is noticed when the African 
Development Bank indicator of gender equality is used.  
8
 According to ‘Egalité Maintenant’, more than 58.2% of Liberians have been victims of FGM.  
9
 It is a clandestine society with substantial political influence, composed of women who encourage and practice 
FGM within the framework of femininity initiation rites.  
10
 Liberia was one of the first countries to implement the UNAIDS programme for girls and women. The 
programme sets strategic priorities for the defence of girls’ and women rights. It also ensures gender equality in 
the fight against HIV.  
11
 http://www.unaids.org/fr/resources/presscentre/featurestories/2012/april/20120413liberia/ (Accessed : 
20/07/2013). 
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The second indicator illustrates the issue of fundamental gender inequality, which has 
often been neglected. At this level, we notice a significant statistical difference. The FEJS 
period presents relatively better results. In essence, taking into consideration the scale of 
measurement, the risk of minimising this deviation is important. Hence, such minimisation 
will be a practical error. As concerns the Pettitt test, the p-value clearly shows that the null 
hypothesis for a homogeneous series is rejected. Hence, we can establish that some deviation 
occurred between the two parties in the time series. Accordingly, the risk of rejecting the null 
hypothesis while it is correct is less than 0.01%. The graph associated with this result shows 
this deviation. In fact, the rupture occurred well before President Sirleaf came to power. As 
concerns the SNHT test, the risk of rejecting the null hypothesis (H0) when it is correct is less 
than 1.16%. With regard to the Buishand test, the risk of rejecting the null hypothesis while it 
is correct is 0.01%. Von Neumann’s rapport shows that the risk of rejecting the H0 when it 
correct is less than 0.17%.  
If from a general perspective, these different tests effectively attest to some rapture in 
results, it is something else when it comes to determining the point from which changes occur 
in the time series. The Pettitt is in favour of 2004, while those of SNHT and Buishand 
propose 2007. If this is the case, then Ellen Johnson Sirleaf should be responsible for changes 
in the series.  
The female economic rights indicator converge all the deviation tests. There is a point 
above which this indicator is different. The point is situated around the year 2007, which is 
after Ellen was elected into office. The results are statistically important because the BEJS 
and FEJS are different. Hence, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the score realised during 
the first mandate of the president Sirleaf is higher relative to the period before her.  
Have women become more active under the presidency of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf ? 
Even if the difference between the two periods appears weak, the two periods are nonetheless 
statistically different. For Buishand, the p-value obtained is less than 0.0001 and hence, the 
null hypothesis is rejected. It can therefore be established that there is an interval of time t 
from which the mean of variables change. The risk of rejecting H0 meanwhile it is correct is 
less than 0.01%. The same conclusion can be inferred from other tests related to series 
homogeneity, even though there is some divergence on the year of rupture. Meanwhile, in all 
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cases, we cannot firmly establish that the impulse was during the first mandate of Sirleaf (or 
in FEJS). 
When it comes to women rights, we observe a significant difference between the two 
periods, albeit with a low level of confidence.   The lifetime of the rapport is 2 when the mean 
is constant. The corresponding p-value is 0.488 and we cannot reject the null hypothesis on 
data homogeneity. This finding is consistent with the preceding results based on other tests 
which have established the absence of rupture. The risk of rejecting H0 when it is correct is 
48.75%.  
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Tableau 1. Statistical Analysis  
Variables 
 
 
 
Tests 
Gender equality  
(BM) 
 
Equality of 
representation in 
rural zones 
 
Female economic 
rights 
 
Participation of 
women in active life 
 
Political rights of 
women 
 
Legislation on 
violence against 
women 
 
BEJS FEJS BEJS FEJS BEJS FEJS FEJS FEJS BEJS FEJS BEJS FEJS 
Means 2.5 
 
2.5 
 
2.08 3.02 
 
0.67 
 
1.6 
 
66.12 
 
66.54 
 
2 
 
2.4 
 
1 1 
 
Difference-in- 
means test 
 Diff=-0.937 
t= -3.2641  
Pr(T < t) = 0.012 
Diff=-0.933 
t= -2.888 
Pr(T < t) = 0.010 
Diff= -0.423 
t= -6.798 
Pr(T < t) = 0.000 
Diff= -0.4 
t= -1.633 
Pr(T < t) = 0.089   
 
Pettitt Test No change during the 
period  
K= 30.000 
t= 2004 
p-value= < 0.0001 
K=24.000 
t=2007 
p-value=< 0.0001 
K=30.000 
t=2004 
p-value=< 0.0001 
K=12.000 
t=2005 
p-value=0.222 
No change during the 
period 
SNHT Test No change during the 
period  
T0= 7.383 
t= 2007 
p-value= 0.012 
T0=6.944 
t=2007 
p-value=0.007 
T0=8.297 
t=2005 
p-value=0.002 
T0=2.667 
t=2005 
p-value=0.447 
No change during the 
period  
Buishand Test No change during the 
period 
Q=4.209 
t=2007 
p-value=0.007 
Q=4.082 
t=2007 
p-value=0.011 
Q=4.989 
t=2005 
p-value=< 0.0001 
Q=2.828 
t=2005 
p-value=0.211 
No change during the 
period 
Rapport of von 
Neumann 
No change during the 
period 
N=0.562 
p-value=0.002 
N=0.611 
p-value=0.001 
N=0.102 
p-value=< 0.0001 
N=2.444 
p-value=0.488 
No change during the 
period 
BEJS: Period before Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. FEJS: First mandate of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf.  
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 We cannot fail to acknowledge changes that have occurred during the presidency of 
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. However, with regards to the underlying statistical analysis, it is not 
very apparent to affirm that her presidency has been a fundamental catalyst. In fact, of the 
four indicators for which there are some differences between the period before and during her 
presidency, only two display some statistical rupture during her presidency, namely: 
representations in rural areas and women economic rights. We are thus far from direct and 
indirect effects of female representation put forward in the literature on the behaviour of the 
underlying variables.  
 We also acknowledge that expectations from the first mandate of her presidency 
should not be overly exaggerated because this sector is affected by a number of constraints, 
notably: (i) informal institutions which naturally play a substantial role and (ii) certain 
changes for which results can only be expected in the long-term. In essence, as it has been 
established in many studies (Gopal & Salim, 1998), informal institutions can either 
consolidate or weaken formal institutions. This is the basis for social contradictions (or social 
tensions) and even the inapplicability and disrespect of laws. As to what concerns the issue of 
women, gender-inequality may fundamentally be traceable to stereotypes (Huddy & 
Terkildsen, 1993; Eagly & Karau, 2002).  
 The above findings have strong implications for contemporary African development 
for at least a twofold reason. On the one hand, gender equality is crucial in the fight against 
poverty and on the other hand, the April 2015 publication by the World Bank on attainment of 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) concludes that poverty has been decreasing in all 
regions of the world, with the exception of sub-Saharan Africa (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 
2015). The narrative sustains that about 45% of countries in the sub-region are off-track from 
attaining the MDGs extreme poverty target. Liberia features prominently among these lagging 
countries. But why is gender inequality important in the responsiveness of growth to extreme 
poverty eradications. Consistent with Asongu and Kodila-Tedika (2014) from the Fosu 
conjectures, the responsiveness of poverty to growth is a decreasing function of inequality, 
essentially because the growth elasticity of poverty is lower than the inequality elasticity of 
poverty.  In more specific terms:  “The study finds that the responsiveness of poverty to 
income is a decreasing function of inequality” (Fosu, 2010a, p. 818); “The responsiveness of 
poverty to income is a decreasing function of inequality, and the inequality elasticity of 
poverty is actually larger than the income elasticity of poverty” (Fosu, 2010b, p. 1432) and 
13 
 
“In general, high initial levels of inequality limit the effectiveness of growth in reducing 
poverty while growing inequality increases poverty directly for a given level of growth” 
(Fosu, 2011, p. 11). 
 
4. Conclusion 
Do women really improve conditions for gender equality after becoming heads of states? This 
question has been the principal motivation of the present line of inquiry. We have considered 
the Republic of Liberia as our sample. The choice of this country is justified by the fact that it 
is the only country with a female head of state for which comparable data is available.  We 
have scrupulously analysed six main gender indicators, namely: gender equality, equality of 
representation in rural areas (basic community), economic rights of women, participation of 
women to active life, political rights of women and legislations for the protection against 
violence on women. After disaggregating the dataset into two sub-samples, we have 
performed the difference-in-means tests on the one hand, then on the other hand analysed 
ruptures in the series with the Pettitt, SNHT, and Buishand tests as well as the Von Neumann 
rapport.  
 Surprisingly, we have noticed that the first and last indicators behave in an identical 
manner. In fact, between the period preceding Ellen Johnson’s mandate and the period of her 
mandate, there is not a significant difference in the means of underlying indicators. In other 
words, the mean values are similar. With regards to other indicators, the period before her 
presidency is statistically different from her first mandate. However, we only notice positive 
and statistical ruptures for equality of representation in rural areas and the economic rights of 
women. This more or less contrasts with the direct and indirect effects often associated with 
women in power.  
 The above results leave room for a number of future research directions. The use of 
approaches of like experimental evaluation and randomisation could be considered in the 
context of alternative case studies. In-depth descriptive and econometric analyses could also 
be considered. The use of the following indicators are also worthwhile, inter alia: the relative 
speaking time of females elected for legislative purposes, the content of their discourses in the 
National Assembly, laws initiated in view of improving the conditions of women and the 
nature of female parliamentary votes. The highlighted variables could be compared with those 
of the masculine gender to assess the effectiveness in the fight against gender inequality in 
14 
 
African parliaments.  These suggestions would go a long way to improving the extant of 
knowledge on the issues.  
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Appendices: Graphical representations of statistical tests for Liberia  
 
Appendix 1: Equality of representation in rural areas  
1a. Pettitt Test 
 
Y-axis: Equality of representation in rural areas 
X-axis: Years  
 
1b.Standard Normal Homogeneity Test (SNHT) 
 
Y-axis: Equality of representation in rural areas 
X-axis: Years  
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1c. Buishand Test 
 
Y-axis: Equality of representation in rural areas 
X-axis: Years  
 
Appendix 2 : Female economic rights  
2a. Pettitt  Test 
 
Y-axis: Female economic rights 
X-axis: Years  
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2b. Standard Normal Homogeneity Test 
 
Y-axis: Female economic rights 
X-axis: Years 
 
2c. Buishand Test 
 
Y-axis: Female economic rights 
X-axis: Years 
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Appendix 3: Participation of women in active life  
3a. Pettitt  Test 
 
Y-axis: Participation of women in active life  
X-axis: Years 
3b. Standard Normal Homogeneity Test 
 
Y-axis: Participation of women in active life  
X-axis: Years 
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3c. Buishand  Test 
 
Y-axis: Participation of women in active life  
X-axis: Years 
 
Appendix 4 : Female political rights 
4a. Pettitt Test 
 
Y-axis: Female political rights   
X-axis: Years 
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4b. Standard Normal Homogeneity Test 
 
Y-axis: Female political rights   
X-axis: Years 
 
4c. Buishand Test 
 
Y-axis: Female political rights   
X-axis: Years 
 
